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“Three is a crowd” is an old proverb that applies as much to social interactions, as it does to frustrated
configurations in statistical physics models. Accordingly, social relations within a triangle deserve special at-
tention. With this motivation, we explore the impact of topological frustration on the evolutionary dynamics of
the snowdrift game on a triangular lattice. This topology provides an irreconcilable frustration, which prevents
anti-coordination of competing strategies that would be needed for an optimal outcome of the game. By using
different strategy updating protocols, we observe complex spatial patterns in dependence on payoff values that
are reminiscent to a honeycomb-like organization, which helps to minimize the negative consequence of the
topological frustration. We relate the emergence of these patterns to the microscopic dynamics of the evolution-
ary process, both by means of mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations. For comparison, we
also consider the same evolutionary dynamics on the square lattice, where of course the topological frustration
is absent. However, with the deletion of diagonal links of the triangular lattice, we can gradually bridge the
gap to the square lattice. Interestingly, in this case the level of cooperation in the system is a direct indicator
of the level of topological frustration, thus providing a method to determine frustration levels in an arbitrary
interaction network.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of cooperation is still a major open problem
in biological and social sciences [1]. After all, why should
self-interested individuals incur costs to provide benefits to
others? This puzzle has been traditionally studied by means
of evolutionary game theory, and with remarkable success [2–
6]. The prisoner’s dilemma game [6, 7], for example, is the
classical setup of a social dilemma. The population is best off
if everybody would cooperate, but the individual does best if
it defects, and that regardless of what other choose to do. In
classical game theory, the Nash equilibrium of the prisoner’s
dilemma game, indeed the rational choice, is thus to defect.
Nevertheless, cooperation flourishes in nature, and it is in fact
much more common as could be anticipated based on the fun-
damental Darwinian premise that only the fittest survive. Hu-
mans, birds, ants, bees, and even different species between
one another, all cooperate to a more or less great extent [8–
10].
An important step forward in understanding the evolution
of cooperation theoretically was to consider spatially struc-
tured populations, modeled for example by a square lattice,
which has been done first by Nowak and May [11] who dis-
covered network reciprocity. In spatially structured popula-
tions cooperators may survive because of the formation of
compact clusters, where in the interior they are protected
against the invasion of defectors. Other prominent mecha-
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nisms that support the evolution of cooperation include kin
selection [12], mobility and dilution [13, 14], direct and in-
direct reciprocity [15, 16], network reciprocity [11, 17–19],
group selection [20], and population heterogeneity [21–24].
In particular, research in the realm of statistical physics has
shown that properties of the interaction network can have far
reaching consequences for the outcome of evolutionary so-
cial dilemmas [25–37] (for reviews see [38–44]), and more-
over, that heterogeneity in general, be it introduced in the form
of heterogeneous interaction networks, noisy disturbances to
payoffs, or other player-specific properties like the teaching
activity or the propensity to acquire new links over time, is a
strong facilitator of cooperation [22, 37, 45–63].
However, the impact of a structured population is not al-
ways favorable for the evolution of cooperation. If the inter-
action network links three individuals into a triangle, it may
be challenging, or even impossible, to come up with a distri-
bution of strategies that ensures everybody is best off (even if
one assumes away the constrains of the evolutionary competi-
tion) [64]. In the snowdrift game, anti-coordination of the two
competing strategies is needed for an optimal outcome of the
game. Clearly, in a triangle, if one individual cooperates and
the other defects, the third player is frustrated because it is im-
possible to choose a strategy that would work best with both
its neighbors. Similarly frustrated setups occur in traditional
statistical physics, and have in fact been studied frequently in
solid-state physics [65, 66]. In anti-ferromagnetic systems,
for example, spins seek the opposite state of their neighbors,
and again, it is clearly impossible to achieve this in a triangle.
As noted above, the snowdrift game is in this regard conceptu-
ally identical, and thus one can draw on methods of statistical
2physics and on the knowledge from related systems in solid-
state physics to successfully study the evolutionary dynamics
of cooperation in settings that constitute a social dilemma.
The manifestation of topological frustration in the snow-
drift game, however, can depend strongly on how the players
update their strategies during the evolutionary process. In the
light of recent human experiments [38, 67–72], we here con-
sider not only the generally used imitation dynamics, but also
the so-called logit rule (also known as myopic dynamics) [73–
75]. The latter can be considered as more innovative, allowing
players to choose strategies that are not within their neighbor-
hood if they provide a good response to the strategies of their
neighbors. Although the long term evolution in animals is best
described by imitation dynamics, humans tend to be more in-
ventive, and thus their behavior aptly described also by inno-
vative dynamics [6, 38, 70–72, 76–82]. Indeed, the impact of
the logit rule and of closely related strategy updating protocols
on the outcomes of evolutionary games on the square lattice
has been studied extensively [74, 79, 80, 83–85], but there the
topological frustration is absent.
In what follows, we fill this gap by studying the snowdrift
game on the triangular lattice, as well as the transition from
the square to the triangular lattice, both by means of mean-
field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations. Our main
objective is to reveal how an inherent topological frustration
affects the evolutionary outcomes. We observe fascinating
honeycomb-like patterns, and we devise an elegant method
to determine the level of frustration in an arbitrary interaction
network through the stationary level of cooperation. Before
presenting the main results, we first describe the mathemat-
ical model, and we conclude with a discussion of the wider
implications of our findings.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
In our model, players have only two possible strategies,
namely cooperation (C) and defection (D), and the game is
played in a pairwise manner as defined by the interaction net-
work. During each pairwise interaction players receive a pay-
off according to the payoff matrix [6, 38]
(C D
C R S
D T P
)
, (1)
where T ∈ [0, 2], S ∈ [−1, 1] and R = 1, P = 0. This
parametrization is useful as it spans four different classes of
games, namely the prisoner’s dilemma game (PD), the snow-
drift game (SD), the stag-hunt game (SH), and the harmony
game (HG) [38, 75, 83, 86]. After players collect their payoff,
they may change their strategies based on a particular strategy
updating rule. In this paper, we consider the logit rule and
compare it with the classical imitation rule.
The logit rule is based on the kinetic Ising model of mag-
netism (also known as Glauber dynamics [66, 87]). The site
will change its strategy with probability
p(∆ui) =
1
1 + e−(ui∗−ui)/K
(2)
where ui is the site current payoff, ui∗ is the site’s payoff if
it changed to the opposite strategy, and the states of neigh-
borhood remain unchanged. Finally K is a parameter that
measures the irrationality of players. In the literature K is
usually set between K ∈ [0.001, 0.4] to simulate a small, but
non-zero, chance of making mistakes [6, 38], we set it to be
0.1. Mathematically, the model is equivalent to the statis-
tics used in physics to describe the dynamics of spins in a
Fermi-Dirac distribution and is widely used in evolutionary
dynamics [88]. In the context of game theory, this kind of
update rule (also know as myopic best response [74]) is re-
garded as a player asking himself what would be the bene-
fits of changing his strategy (even when there is no neighbor
with different strategy). This means that the logit rule is an
innovative dynamic, since new strategies can spontaneously
appear. Recently, the logit rule has been the focus of many
works [38, 67–69, 74, 79, 80, 83–85] as it leads to very differ-
ent results compared to imitation models. As we see, this rule
is closely related to rational analysis of a situation, instead of
the reproduction of the “fittest” behavior. Although evolution-
ary game theory has its bases rooted in biological populations
dynamics, recent works shows that the modeling of humans
playing games can have more in common with innovative dy-
namics [67–69, 79, 89].
The imitation rule, or imitation dynamics, is one of the
most common update rules in iterated evolutionary game the-
ory [6, 38], and is based on the concept of the fittest strategy
reproducing to neighboring sites. Here we will use it as a
baseline for comparison with our results. Site i will update its
state by randomly choosing one of its neighbors, j, and then
comparing their payoff. Site i adopts the strategy of j with
probability
p(∆uij) =
1
1 + e−(uj−ui)/K
, (3)
where ui,j is the total payoff of site i, j [90]. Note that player i
can only change its strategy to the ones available in its neigh-
borhood. This means that new strategies can never appear
once extinguished and players never “explore” new strategies,
which can be interpreted as a non-innovative dynamic. This
model is associated with biological processes, where each
strategy is regarded as a specie, and once extinguished it will
never re-appear [2, 6, 38, 91]. We note that this is not always
the case when modeling human interactions, who can change
behaviors depending also on other external, and to a large de-
gree unpredictable, factors. We also note that many works
have shown that the strategy updating rule can have profound
influence on the evolution of strategies, even changing the im-
pact of the topology of interaction network [38, 40, 68, 89].
A. Triangular lattice
We make a quick review here to clarify some properties of
the triangular lattice. This topology has an important prop-
erty: every closed loop is comprised of an even number of
steps, which gives rise to frustration phenomena [65]. The
snowdrift game, which is also known as anti-coordination
33T 3T
3T 3T
3T 3T 3T 3T
3T 3T
3T 3T
6S
6S 6S
6S
6S 6S
6S
FIG. 1: (Color online) The minimal frustration configuration in the
triangular lattice. Every blue (dark gray) site (cooperator) receives
the best payoff, although defectors, marked red (light gray), have
only half of their connections leading to the best payoff. Frustrated
bonds are drawn by dashed lines and bonds that maximize the payoff
are drawn by full lines.
game since choosing the opposite strategy of the partner
is a Nash-equilibrium, is strongly affected by network in-
herent frustration. In square lattices, the logit rule yields
a population displaying a very stable checkerboard pattern,
as everyone can choose to do the opposite of all neighbors
[38, 74, 80, 85, 89, 92–94]. In contrast, this spatial ordering is
impossible in the triangular lattice, as shown in Fig. 1. Every
pair of different strategies will share at least one third neighbor
that will be frustrated. This phenomenon is well explored in
magnetic models, where many interesting “spin-glass” phe-
nomena can arise [65, 95]. In spin models we see that the
“minimum energy” configuration would be similar to the pat-
tern shown in Fig. 1. We wish to analyze this situation in evo-
lutionary game dynamics. One type of player is surrounded
by a honeycomb structure of the opposite type, repeated in-
finitely for a large lattice. Notice that the central site (blue)
does not have any frustrated connections, while the other type
(red) is frustrated in half of its connections.
III. RESULTS
We start showing that, mathematically, the formal relation
between anti-coordination games and anti-ferromagnetic sys-
tems [38, 74, 75, 80, 84, 85, 89, 93, 94, 96] is not an identity.
Let us consider a matrix for the energy of a single spin in a
magnet with coupling constant J and an external magnetic
field B, similar to the payoff matrix 1:
( ↑ ↓
↑ −J −B J − B
↓ J +B −J +B
)
. (4)
The spins in the anti-ferromagnet (J < 0) tend to point in the
opposite direction as their neighbors, as in anti-coordination
games individuals tend to do the opposite of their neighbors.
However, equating the payoff matrix to the energy matrix
(−J−B = R, J−B = S, J+B = T , and−J+B = P ) and
requiring the snowdrift payoff condition (T > R > S > P )
yield
J +B > 0, 0 > J and J > B, (5)
which is a mathematical absurd. There is no combination of
parameters that obey both the physical symmetry of magnetic
system and the dilemma hierarchy of game theory for a gen-
eral case. In other words, the magnetic system obeys a diag-
onal symmetry in the matrix, whereas the game theory obeys
a linear hierarchy of the parameters in the matrix, both can-
not be fulfilled simultaneously. It is important to stress that,
although we will see many phenomena in the simulations that
are analogous to anti-ferromagnetism, the systems are not for-
mally identical.
A. Master equation
Let us analyze the logit model using mean-field approxi-
mation at nearest-neighbor level [38, 97, 98]. For simplicity
we set S = 0 in this section. If T > 1, we have the so-called
weak prisoner’s dilemma. Consider a central site i on a lattice.
It interacts only with its four (square lattice) or six (triangular
lattice) nearest neighbors (Ω neighborhood). In this setup, we
present the master equation for the average fraction of coop-
erators, ρ (note that ρ is a function of t):
ρ˙ = (1− ρ)Γ+(C→D) − ρΓ−(D→C) (6)
where Γ± is the probability for the central player to change
its strategy to C (D). We obtain
(
N
n
)
different neighborhood
configurations whereN is 4 for the square lattice and 6 for the
triangular lattice and n is the number of cooperative neighbors
for each neighborhood configuration. Therefore:
Γ± =
N∑
n=0
(
N
n
)
ρn(1− ρ)(N−n)P±(ui, uΩ). (7)
Here,
(
N
n
)
are the binomial coefficients and weights the rep-
etitions of identical configurations. Note that while n varies
in the summation, N is fixed for each lattice type. The term
ρn(1− ρ)(N−n) weights the probability of such configuration
and P±(ui, uΩ) is the probability, in a specific configuration,
that the central site will turn into a cooperator (P+) or a de-
fector (P−). This probability is the only term that is directly
dependent on the update rule chosen (logit or imitation). For
the logit rule the focal site changes the state comparing its cur-
rent payoff (ui) with its future payoff if the state was changed,
(u∗). Calculating P+(ui, uΩ), for the case where the central
site is D and changes to C, we have:
P+(ui, uΩ) =
1
1 + e−(u∗−ui)/K
. (8)
Analytically, one of the advantages of the logit model is
that the probability does not depend explicitly on the payoffs
of the neighborhoodΩ. If the central site is D (C), the payoff
difference, for any configuration, will be:
(u∗ − ui)D→C = n(1 − T ) , (9)
(u∗ − ui)C→D = n(T − 1). (10)
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The fraction of cooperators in equilibrium
as a function of T . The results refer to Monte Carlo simulations
(symbols) and the master equation ODE (lines) in the logit model
for both lattices. Note that simulation and analytical results agree
well and reproduce the main characteristic of the system, namely a
non-vanishing cooperation level.
Using A = (1− T )/K to simplify, we get:
P±(ui, uΩ) =
1
1 + e∓nA
. (11)
Remember that the solution for the master equation of the
imitation model can be found in the literature [6, 38, 56]. The
master equation for the logit model becomes:
ρ˙ =
N∑
n=0
(
N
n
)
ρn(1− ρ)(N−n)
(
1
1 + e
−n(1−T )
K
− ρ
)
. (12)
This yields a 6th order polynomial that analytically have at
least one root in the region 0 < ρ∗ < 1. This is independent
of T , meaning that at the nearest-neighbor level there exist at
least some minimum cooperation level independently of the
value of temptation. The existence of a minimum level of
cooperation is an interesting result, agreeing with other ap-
proaches on innovative dynamics that found similar results
using Monte Carlo simulations and experiments with humans
[67–69, 74, 79, 84, 85, 99, 100].
To obtain the time-independent solution of the master equa-
tion we use a 4th order Runge-Kutta integrator. As in other
models, the system reaches a stable state after some time.
In our model the behavior of ρ(t)t→∞ is independent of the
initial fraction of cooperation. This is an important feature,
as not every update rule will have a equilibrium state inde-
pendent of the initial conditions [79, 86, 101, 102]. Fig-
ure 2 shows the cooperation level for the stable equilibrium
(ρ(t)t→∞) as a function of T . We compare the Monte Carlo
simulation (further analyzed bellow) with the numerical so-
lution for the master equation in both topologies. The mean
field approach agrees with the simulation results and, most
importantly, both approaches report a basal cooperation level
for any T .
The mean-field technique is a good approximation to obtain
insights and confirm the prediction of other methods. Even so,
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The fraction of cooperators in equilibrium as a
function of T , as obtained by means of Monte Carlo simulations (for
S = 0). Note that the difference between the logit and the imitation
model is significant for T > 1, where the logit model exhibits a min-
imal cooperation level. Also note that the sharp drop in cooperation
occurs in the same region.
it does not always returns the same results as in the structured
population [38, 75], it is only an approximation. In our case, it
is interesting to notice that both methodologies (Monte Carlo
and mean field) report the minimal level of cooperation that is
independent of the value of temptation. This kind of basal co-
operation level was also found in other studies using innova-
tive dynamics, even with different update rules and topologies
[74, 84, 85].
B. Monte Carlo simulations
We use the asynchronous Monte Carlo procedure to sim-
ulate the evolutionary dynamics. First, a randomly chosen
player, i, is selected. The cumulative payoff of i and of
its nearest neighbors payoffs are calculated. Then player i
changes its strategy based on the update probability defined in
Eq. 2 for logit or in Eq. 3 for imitation dynamics. One Monte
Carlo step (MCS) consists of this process repeated L2 times,
where L is the lattice linear size (here we set L = 100). For
a detailed discussion on Monte Carlo methods in evolutionary
dynamics we suggest Refs. [38, 103–105]. We ran the algo-
rithm until the equilibrium state (104− 105MCS’s); then we
average over 1000 MCS’s for 10 − 20 different initial con-
ditions. We used periodic boundary conditions and random,
homogeneous initial strategy distribution.
Starting with the weak prisoner’s dilemma (S = 0), we
compare the logit with the imitative dynamics. Figure 3 shows
ρ as a function of T . The logit model has a sharp decay in co-
operation, almost at the same point where the imitation model
has a transition [38, 75]. This is valid for both square and
triangular lattices. Also, it is remarkable that for large T a
minimal global value of cooperation survives, confirming the
prediction of our mean field approach.
Figure 4 shows the fraction of cooperation in the entire
T − S plane in the imitation and logit models, for both trian-
5FIG. 4: (Color online) Heat maps encoding the cooperation level for
the whole T − S plane. The top row, (a) and (b), shows results ob-
tained on the square lattice, while the bottom row, (c) and (d), shows
results obtained on the triangular lattice. The left column, (a) and (c),
shows results obtained with the imitation dynamics, and the right
column, (b) and (d), shows the results obtained with the logit rule.
When imitation dynamics is used, there is little difference inferable
that would be due to the differences in the interaction lattice. For the
logit model, the level of cooperation is higher in the SD region for
both topologies. Most interestingly, for the triangular lattice, we can
observe two different phases that are separated by a straight line.
gular and square lattices. Notice how similar the outcomes are
in the HG, PD and SH games. The difference appears in the
snowdrift game. Imitation dynamics yields similar results in
both square and triangular lattices, but logit dynamics yields
different results. More specifically, while in the logit model
on the square lattice there is a flat plateau of 50% cooperation
(deeply studied in [74, 84, 85]), in the triangular lattice there
are basically two phases separated by a straight diagonal line
(S = T − 1). Notice that on the square lattice the whole SD
region is associated with a static checkerboard pattern, cor-
responding to the Nash Equilibrium, which is the most effi-
cient way of increasing the population payoff, as previously
stressed in [74, 80, 83–85, 93, 100]). It is also interesting to
notice that for the logit model, cooperation survives indepen-
dently of T for some range of S (around S ≃ −0.15) in the
PD region.
Studying the SD region for triangular lattice in the logit dy-
namics, we find a plateau of ρ ≃ 0.35 bellow the diagonal line
and ρ ≃ 0.65 above it, with minor fluctuations of ±0.05. We
further refer to Refs. [74, 84, 85, 93] for the analysis of the
square lattice, where such plateau is also found with a single
phase (ρ = 0.5). In principle, there would be two “ground
states” exhibiting a honeycomb pattern: a concatenation of
cells with a centralD surrounded by C’s and a concatenation
of cells with a central C surrounded by D’s. Let us consider
the first “ground state”, where the central site in each cell of
the honeycomb configuration is a defector surrounded by 6
FIG. 5: (Color online) The fraction of cooperators in equilibrium
along the line defined by T = 2 − S in the logit model on a tri-
angular lattice. Here the payoff values are varied via the control
parameter r, where T = 1 + r and S = 1 − r. Instead of a ho-
mogeneous state, like on the square lattice, we observe two different
phases with honeycomb-like spatial patterns. The insets illustrate the
typical honeycomb cell that is characteristic of each phase.
cooperators. Each one of these 6 cooperators is shared by 3
distinct cells. The fraction ρ in an infinite lattice is calculated
as the fraction of cooperators in the cell, weighting each site
by the number of blocks which share it. So we have
ρ =
6/3
6/3 + 1
=
2
3
(13)
The calculation for the other “ground state” is analogous,
yielding ρ = 1/3. Most interestingly, the systems is driven
to one of the two “ground states” configurations depending on
the payoff parameters. To make this point clearer, in Fig. 5
we show the fraction of cooperation for parameters along a
straight line orthogonal to the line that divides the plateaus ob-
served in the SD region. We can clearly see the two plateaus
and the transition point where the roles of C and D players
are exchanged, as shown in the incept of the patterns.
The logit model seems to drive the system to the maxi-
mum attainable global payoff (related to the minimum energy
level). To further study this hypothesis, we quantify the frus-
tration, φ, defined as the fraction of frustrated links. In SD
games the frustrated links are the CC and DD pairs. Note
that our definition of frustration is a good measurement of
the “homogeneity” and global spatial structure of the lattice:
the frustration is 1 for any homogeneous state, regardless of
the cooperation level, and can be zero, for example, in the
chess board pattern configuration of cooperators and defec-
tors on square lattices. In both “ground states” configuration
of the triangular lattice, we can easily show that the frustra-
tion is equal to 1/3. In Fig. 6 we compare the lattice frustra-
tion of logit and imitation rules for the SD region (frustration
is meaningless outside this parameter range). The imitation
model maintains a high frustration, around 60%, whereas the
logit model maintains a moderate frustration, around 35%, in-
dependently of payoff values of T or S, which is very close
to the analytical solution of the honeycomb structure. Note
6FIG. 6: (Color online) The level of frustration, φ, in the snowdrift
region of the T − S diagram for the imitation (a) and logit (b) strat-
egy updating rules on the triangular lattice. The imitation model has
many frustrated links, around 60%, while the logit model maintains
the low and homogeneous frustration of around 35%.
that on triangular lattices the minimum achievable frustration
is 1/3, as there is an inevitable topological frustration. Also
note how frustration quickly rises to almost 1 in the borders of
the diagram, where there is full cooperation or full defection.
To further support our claims, we present snapshots of the
lattices in dynamic equilibrium on the SD region. The Monte
Carlo method is of course probabilistic, and accurate results
are dependent on sufficiently large averages [38, 103–105].
Even so, it is insightful to see the images of the lattice af-
ter the system has reached a dynamical equilibrium. Figure 7
shows typical snapshots of logit and imitation update rules for
square and triangular lattices. It is clear the differences in spa-
tial organization exhibited in each model. We see that in both
topologies the imitation update tends to maintain cooperators
in clusters whereas the logit model tends to distribute strate-
gies more homogeneously. Specifically, the logit model on
square lattice tends to form a checkerboard pattern, a behav-
ior that has been consistently reported in different innovative
rules [74, 80, 83–85, 93, 100] and is usually attributed to the
population re-arranging itself to receive the highest total pay-
off achievable. For the triangular lattice we can see that the ex-
pected frustrated pattern illustrated in Fig. 1 indeed emerges.
It is worth mentioning that it is the absence of clustering that
makes the mean-field approximation a good one for the logit
dynamics. Such phenomena suggests a general behavior ex-
hibited by innovative dynamics that leads to the emergence
of specific spatial structures, other than cooperation islands.
We note that, while clustering has a strong effect on everyday
cooperative interactions [106, 107], the emergence of diluted
patterns in ourmodel suggests that some role-separating struc-
ture may also emerge in human population, where members
have different roles to obtain a higher collective income.
Lastly, we analyze the representative microscopic mecha-
nisms that explain how strategy evolution accommodates to
topological frustration. In Fig. 8(a) we present a local strategy
distribution where the central site is highly unlikely to change
its strategy that makes the honeycomb configuration very sta-
ble. Conceptually similar stable local distribution can be
drawn where a defector is surrounded by cooperators. How-
ever, the sites around the central stable site are not fully satis-
fied because they have some frustrated bonds. This situation is
illustrated in Fig. 8(b) where a frustrated node is in the center.
FIG. 7: (Color online) Typical snapshots of the square lattice in the
top row, (a) and (b), and the triangular lattice in the bottom row,
(c) and (d), in the SD region. The left column, (a) and (c), shows the
results for imitation model while the right column, (b) and (d), shows
the results for the logit model. In the logit model on the square lattice
a checkerboard pattern quickly emerges. In the logit model on the
triangular lattice, on the other hand, we see the honeycomb pattern.
Here we use T = 1.2 and S = 0.5.
Here the central site has a higher chance to change its strat-
egy depending on the difference between (3T ) and (3 + 3S).
The threshold value is at the line S = T − 1 which agrees
perfectly with the border line we observed in Fig. 4. The frus-
trated sites have a pivotal role in the separation of phases il-
lustrated in Fig. 5. For low T values, that is for S > T − 1,
cooperators fare better than defectors, allowing them to stay
in “frustrated” sites of the honeycomb configuration. This re-
sults in a large number of cooperators, as every defector will
be surrounded by 6 cooperators (ρ ∼ 2/3 in the infinitely re-
peated limit). The opposite is also true for S < T−1, namely,
the defectors have a high payoff, allowing them to stay in the
frustrated positions of the honeycomb patches. As a result, a
stable cooperator will be surrounded by 6 defectors yielding a
relatively low cooperation level (ρ ∼ 1/3 in the infinite limit).
We found that frustration can induce two distinct orga-
nized patterns on triangular lattices. As we noted, square
lattice topology can be considered as the opposite extreme
case where there is no frustrated bonds between players. We
wonder how these extreme cases can be bridged by an ap-
propriately modified topology where the frustration level can
be tuned gradually. To generate such an intermediate level
of inherent frustration we modify the triangular lattice by re-
moving two diagonal connections of each site. When we al-
ter the originally triangular lattice then the control parameter
is the X fraction of sites that have their diagonal links re-
moved. Accordingly, X = 0 corresponds to the triangular
lattice while at X = 1 the resulting topology agrees with the
7FIG. 8: (Color online) Leading microscopic processes that guide pat-
tern formation in a frustrated topology. (a) A cooperator surrounded
by defectors is very stable, since the change in payoff here would be
−6S. (b) Defectors in the vertices, now shown in the center, may
change their strategy, depending on the parameters. The payoff dif-
ference would be 3(S−T+1). If S > T−1 the chance that defector
becomes a cooperator is high. S = T −1 is the line dividing the two
phases seen in Fig. 4.
square lattice. Note that the network remains static throughout
the evolutionary process and we study how the strategy evo-
lution may change due to the intermediate level of topological
frustration.
Figure 9 shows the resulting cooperation level in depen-
dence on the payoff values for differently frustrated topologies
as characterized by the value ofX . As we start mitigating the
maximal frustration by increasingX , the steep transition point
separating the two plateaus vanishes immediately verifying
that the two ordered phases can only be observed when max-
imal level of frustration is present in the topology. As we in-
creaseX further then the resulting ρ(r) function will approx-
imate the ρ = 0.5 plateau only at the X → 1 limit. It simply
means that the long-range anti-ferromagnetic order of com-
peting strategies disappears immediately when we leave the
X = 1 point and introduce some frustration into the perfectly
frustration-free square lattice topology. In between these ex-
treme cases the shape of the ρ(t) functionmay inform us about
the frustration level of the unknown interaction graph.
IV. DISCUSSION
In social interactions the “best response” is often challeng-
ing, especially if the interaction involves a triangle. In gen-
eral, frustrated situations can arise as a consequence of the
type of game played, due to specific interaction topologies, but
also because of other external factors. Motivated by this phe-
nomenon, we considered the snowdrift game on a triangular
lattice where the topological frustration inhibits the expected
optimal anti-coordination of strategies. By means of master-
equation approximations and Monte Carlo simulations, we
have studied the logit strategy updating protocol, the classi-
cal imitation dynamics, and we have compared the evolution-
ary outcomes obtained on the triangular lattice, the square lat-
tice, and on an abridged transition between the two that was
achieved by randomly adding links to the next-nearest neigh-
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FIG. 9: (Color online) The effect of link deletion on the cooperation
level along the T = 2 − S line in the logit model. Here the payoff
values are varied via the control parameter r, where T = 1+r, while
S = 1 − r. The topology is modified gradually where a fraction X
of diagonal links are removed from a triangular lattice. Accordingly,
X = 0 corresponds to the triangular lattice and X = 1 to the square
lattice topology. If the topological frustration is mitigated by delet-
ing just a few links, then the steep transition between ordered phases
vanishes. Alternatively, when we add a tiny frustration to the inter-
action graph by leaving X = 1 then the anti-ferromagnetic order
disappears immediately.
bors of the square lattice. Our principal interest was to reveal
how topological frustration influence the strategy ordering in
a spatial system.
In stark contrast to the square lattice where anti-
coordination ordering can emerge, the frustrated topology of
triangular lattice generates two ordered phases in the snow-
drift quadrant. These states are separated by the S = T − 1
line. While for low T values cooperators occupy 2/3 of the
available sites and the rest is occupied by defectors, their roles
are exchanged for high T values. In both phases the system
evolves into a state which is reminiscent to a honeycomb-
like pattern that helps to minimize the negative consequence
of the topological frustration. We have identified the micro-
scopic mechanisms which compose these patterns, and we
have found that such formations are very stable. By compar-
ing them with the outcome of imitation dynamics, we have
found that the logit rule allows the whole system to evolve
into the least frustrated strategy distribution that is achievable
on each lattice, which also provides the highest population
payoff. This state is reached via a strategy distribution where
cooperators are less clustered comparing to the patterns con-
structed by imitation dynamics.
The striking difference between frustration-free (square)
and frustrated (triangle) lattices raises a question on what we
shall expect if the interaction graph is disordered and the level
of topological frustration is unknown. What kind of behavior
is expected in such a case? To clarify this, we have introduced
a method which allowed us to modify the level of topolog-
ical frustration gradually. Starting from a triangular lattice,
we have randomly deleted a fraction of diagonal links, which
decreased the frustration between neighboring bonds. If all di-
8agonal links were deleted, then we arrive at the square lattice.
We found that the two ordered phases in the snowdrift quad-
rant disappear as we mitigate the frustration level. On the
other hand, the well-known anti-ferromagnetic like checker-
board pattern observed on a square lattice, which is valid
for the whole scan of the mentioned quadrant of the T − S
plane, evaporates immediately as we introduce a tiny frustra-
tion into the interaction topology. These phenomena highlight
how frustration can drive individuals to form complex global
patterns, and more importantly, how innovative dynamics can
drive the system to the best, i.e., least frustrated, evolutionary
outcome.
As the strategy updating rule can drastically alter popula-
tion dynamics, it is important to study how different protocols
deal with frustration and which kind of patterns can sponta-
neously emerge from the applied dynamic. This is even more
interesting in the light of emergence of complexity as indi-
viduals interact. The studied logit rule model is essential to
the emergence of the patterns shown here, and recent research
shows the importance of integrating innovative dynamics in
game theoretical models, especially since humans seem to use
different rules than simply imitating the best when playing
evolutionary games [67–69, 79, 108–111]. We hope that this
paper will motivate further research along this area in the fu-
ture.
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